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ABSTRACT
We study the impact of signal jamming attacks against the com-
munication based train control (CBTC) systems and develop the
countermeasures to limit the attacks’ impact. CBTC supports the
train operation automation and moving-block signaling, which im-
proves the transport efficiency. We consider an attacker jamming
the wireless communication between the trains or the train to way-
side access point, which can disable CBTC and the corresponding
benefits. In contrast to prior work studying jamming only at the
physical or link layer, we study the real impact of such attacks on
end users, namely train journey time and passenger congestion.
Our analysis employs a detailed model of leaky medium-based
communication system (leaky waveguide or leaky feeder/coaxial
cable) popularly used in CBTC systems. To counteract the jamming
attacks, we develop a mitigation approach based on frequency hop-
ping spread spectrum taking into account domain-specific struc-
ture of the leaky-medium CBTC systems. Specifically, compared
with existing implementations of FHSS, we apply FHSS not only
between the transmitter-receiver pair but also at the track-side
repeaters. To demonstrate the feasibility of implementing this tech-
nology in CBTC systems, we develop a FHSS repeater prototype
using software-defined radios on both leaky-medium and open-air
(free-wave) channels. We perform extensive simulations driven
by realistic running profiles of trains and real-world passenger
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data to provide insights into the jamming attack’s impact and the
effectiveness of the proposed countermeasure.
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1 INTRODUCTION
With rapid explosion in urban populations, metro systems around
the world are getting increasingly congested. Information and com-
munication technologies (ICTs) can play a key role in relieving the
congestion by improving the railway infrastructure utilization, and
are being increasingly adopted by railway operators. However, their
adoption also makes railways vulnerable to cyber attacks. Exist-
ing cybersecurity of modern railways typically appeals to air gaps
that isolate the ICT systems from public networks. However, there
are growing instances of successful air-gap breaches in railways
[1, 6] and other critical infrastructures (e.g., Black Energy and the
Stuxnet attacks [24], [3]). Such security breaches can have severe
consequences on end users. This is particularly true of railways,
due to deep involvement of humans who use them everyday in
large numbers, where physical isolation is highly questionable in
the first place.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
8.
01
72
3v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  6
 A
ug
 20
18
WiSec ’18, June 18–20, 2018, Stockholm, Sweden S. Lakshminarayana et.al.
In this paper, we study the cybersecurity of communication-
based train control (CBTC) [18], an automatic train control sys-
tem that enables trains to run with shorter headways, thereby
improving track utilization. In CBTC, the trains can continuously
exchange their states of motion (i.e., location, velocity, and acceler-
ation/deceleration capabilities) among each other over high-speed
wireless communication links, and optimize their headway accord-
ingly. However, CBTC has stringent requirements for communica-
tion availability, and the loss of communication can lead to severe
disruptions. A recent real-world incident occurred for the Singa-
pore metro [4], in which a train with faulty signaling hardware
affected the communication of other trains traveling in its vicinity.
This resulted in the trains activating their emergency brakes un-
necessarily, leading to multiple delays and widespread disruptions.
Another incident involving CBTC signaling fault resulted in more
serious train collision [9]. These incidents highlight the importance
of understanding cyber attacks that can cause the loss of signaling
in CBTC and developing countermeasures.
We consider signal jamming attacks against the CBTC, in which
the attacker injects an interference signal into the wireless trans-
mission in order to disrupt the communications (specifically, train-
to-train or train-to-trackside-infrastructure communications). The
jamming can disable the CBTC and negate its benefits such as
transport efficiency. The threat is acute in urban train systems as
they are accessed by and share the same physical space with the
public, as opposed to other critical infrastructures that might be
physically isolated. This co-location heightens the risk as say rogue
attackers close to their targets may readily impart strong interfer-
ences. They can readily do so as outsiders; there is no need for prior
compromise of any credential systems. Moreover, the availability
of software-defined radio (SDR) has lowered the bar significantly
for would-be attackers. They can now launch jamming attacks by
simply commanding a software API, without much expertise in
low-level radios and signal processing. As a result, jamming has
emerged as a major focal point of cybersecurity concerns for train
systems [12, 17, 18].
The attacker’s ability to jam the train communications critically
depends on propagation characteristics of the wireless medium in
question. In this work, we focus on the paradigm of leaky-medium
communication (using waveguide and coaxial cable), which is pop-
ular for trains due to their constrained mobility by the railway
tracks [22]. To support communications over long distances, the
leaky medium-based communication typically employs a tandem
of repeaters to compensate for path loss. We address the impacts
of the leaky medium as an understudied subject compared with
traditional free-wave channels.
We aim to answer the following two research questions in this
paper. (1) How to quantify the true impact of signal jamming at-
tacks? Analysis of the impact will underline the development of
countermeasures and evaluation of their effectiveness. However,
the analysis is challenging because railways are complex cyber-
physical systems. They involve a number of interdependent subsys-
tems operating in concert. In our setting, for example, the trains’
wireless communications impact their motion (e.g., velocities and
corresponding headways), which in turn affects passenger flows
(i.e., passenger wait times and congestion). The latter metrics are
critical since they measure the effects on end users and stakeholders
who truly matter in everyday applications. The investigation must
capture these interdependencies and expose the truly important
end performance of the CBTC.
(2) How to design effective countermeasure against the jamming
attack in today’s train systems? The CBTC environment provides
not only unique challenges but also opportunities for security. We
take advantage of the CBTC communication architecture to achieve
increased jamming resistance compared with prior work.
In addressing the above two research questions, we make the
following main contributions.
We analyze jamming in leakymedium-based communication, which
extends prior such results for the free-wave medium (see also the
discussions in Sec. 2) and is critical for the CBTC application do-
main. The leaky medium has channel characteristics quite distinct
from the case of free wave. Whereas recent work [16] has pointed
out specific issues of leaky medium-based communications under
jamming attacks, their evaluations are limited to the physical com-
munication layer only. Importantly, we evaluate the impacts of the
affected train operations from the end user’s perspective, namely
wait times and congestion. Clearly, train operators are primarily
concerned about the service they provide ultimately to their cus-
tomers, instead of any low level details of the communications per
se. It is because the service quality affects directly their reputation
and profitability. Moreover, operators usually face significant fi-
nancial penalties imposed by governments for service disruptions
or delays. Their licence may even be revoked in extreme cases.
For instance, the U.K. has a penalty scheme that holds rail opera-
tors directly responsible for significant service problems [2]. The
challenge for understanding the end impacts of CBTC jamming
attacks is the lack of an evaluation platform that can integrate the
diverse interacting components operating at different layers of the
overall system. To meet the challenge, in this work we developed a
co-simulation platform that admits holistically (i) a model of train
motion under different signaling modes, (ii) a model of the leaky
medium-based wireless communications that affect the signaling
and train control in turn, and (iii) incorporation of real-world pas-
senger flow datasets [35] that specify the levels and patterns of
demand that are key to the system’s performance in real operation.
The results reveal that while jamming in free-medium commu-
nication may have impact over a limited range only, due to natural
signal attenuation, jamming in leaky-medium communication can
be impactful throughout the train communication space. This is
because jamming over leaky medium can leverage the signal am-
plifications of the repeaters to extend its effects over much longer
distances. For instance, our co-simulations show that the presence
of a single jammer can increase the train journey time by up to
40 minutes, which is approximately a 35% increase, and the average
passenger journey time (sum of waiting time and the travel time)
by about 15 minutes. Comparatively, jamming over the free-wave
medium will only have negligible impact, i.e., less than 1 minute
increase of train journey time. These results highlight the risk of
jamming attacks on train operation in realistic deployments.
Second, we propose and evaluate a defense measure to mitigate
the jamming attacks. Our defense builds on frequency hopping
spread spectrum (FHSS) [15, 27, 29, 30] to protect the availabil-
ity of the CBTC communications. In FHSS, the legitimate parties
randomize the frequency channel access for transmission, so that
Signal Jamming Attacks Against CBTC: Attack Impact & Countermeasure WiSec ’18, June 18–20, 2018, Stockholm, Sweden
the selected channels are dynamic and will appear random to the
attackers. In this work, we improve the effectiveness of the FHSS
by exploiting the domain-specific repeater-based communication
structure of the CBTC. Specifically, in contrast to prior work, we
employ the FHSS not only at the source-destination pair but also
the repeaters between them.
We demonstrate the feasibility of implementing the proposed
defense in CBTC using an SDR-based leaky-coaxial cable testbed.
To realize the anti-jamming at the strategic CBTC repeaters, we
develop a novel FHSS repeater prototype. Based on the setup of
real-world train systems, we consider a trusted entity (e.g., the train
control center) that can communicate securely with the transmitter,
receiver, and repeaters to control the overall operation. We conduct
extensive experiments on the testbed to evaluate prototype. The
results show that the signal-to-interference-noise ratio (SINR) at
the receiver can be significantly enhanced by adopting the FHSS
mitigation. Moreover, using our co-simulator platform, we show
that the impact of jamming attacks on the train journey time and
passenger congestion can be substantially reduced by implementing
the FHSS with 10 channels.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
related work. Section 3 presents an overview of the CBTC commu-
nication system and the jamming threat. Section 4 models the train
motion. The wireless communication model and the attacker model
are presented in Section 5. The proposed FHSS-based mitigation is
presented in Section 6. Section 7 reports our simulation results and
Section 8 presents the FHSS repeater prototype. Section 9 concludes.
2 RELATEDWORK
With widespread adoption of CBTC in urban metros, recent re-
search has optimized the train motion profile leveraging on ac-
curate tracking of the next train or obstacle, e.g., [33, 34, 36–38].
However, none of the aforementioned work on CBTC has addressed
it from a cybersecurity perspective. The security problem is im-
perative, since modern metros integrate ICT increasingly and are
critical infrastructures that attract attacks. Emerging work on rail-
way cybersecurity has focused on trains’ traction power control
[26], whereas we focus on a different kind of attacks (i.e., jamming)
against a very different functional module (i.e., CBTC).
Jamming is a widely recognized concern for wireless systems
and has been well studied [13, 15, 19, 30, 31]. Solutions have been
proposed that use spread spectrum technology to increase inter-
ference resistance, e.g., [15, 27, 29, 30]. Existing work has focused
predominantly on jamming in free-wave medium only, however.
To complement the state of the art, we provide an in-depth study
of jamming in leaky medium-based communications for the con-
text of train communications particularly. Our work is related to a
recent result showing that jamming can gain power through leaky
waveguides and repeaters [16]. But we make contributions beyond
the prior work in two important respects. First, we develop a non-
trivial co-simulator to evaluate the true end impacts of the attack,
whereas they report results for the physical communication layer
only. Second, they do not provide defense measures against the
attack, whereas we design an FHSS-based defense and prototype it
on an SDR platform. Using our co-simulator, we likewise provide
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Figure 1: Leaky-medium-based train communication.
novel results on the effectiveness of the defense from an end user’s
perspective.
3 OVERVIEW OF CBTC AND JAMMING
THREAT
Many modern-day metro systems support Automatic Train Opera-
tion (ATO) to enable the automation of train operations. The train
communication consists of two phases: a wireless part between the
vehicles and thewayside access point and an internal wired network
between the wayside access point and the centralized Operational
Control Center (OCC). To realize greater efficiency, CBTC leverages
on train-to-train and train-to-wayside access point communication.
The train localization signaling is based on the interaction of the
vehicles with the beacons or transponders (placed along the rail-
way track), called balise, that detects the presence of the vehicles.
Thereafter, the wayside access point relays the vehicle location to
the remote OCC systems via wired connection (e.g., optical cable)
in real-time, so that the OCC can monitor the vehicle operation.
To take active measures, OCC relays the operational commands to
wayside access point via the internal network connection, which in
turn wirelessly relays the mission-critical messages to the vehicles.
Examples of wireless protocols used are Global System for Mobile
Communications: Railway (GMS-R) [10] and Terrestrial Trunked
Radio (TETRA) [11].
3.1 Leaky Communication Infrastructure for
Train CBTC
The leaky communication infrastructure, illustrated in Fig. 1, is
a communication medium that guides the wireless communica-
tion signal. Compared to free-medium communication, the leaky
medium limits the signal propagation attenuation and supports a
longer signal transmission range. These leaky communication struc-
tures are in the form of concrete metals with hollow interior (leaky
waveguide) or coaxial cables (leaky feeder/coaxial cable), which
have well-placed slots to support signal propagation to outside of
the structures. The wireless/mobile clients (the mobile train and
the trainborne transmitter/receiver in our case) are not in physical
contact with the medium itself, but communicate via the signals
that are leaked from these slots. The leaked signals attenuate rela-
tively quickly compared to the signal inside the medium because
there is no longer a physical medium to guide their propagation
(open-air medium).
Train communications are ideal to use such mediums because
the train’s mobility is pre-defined and limited to the railway tracks
(the leaky communication infrastructure is close to the railway
tracks, and the limited scope of the signal propagation laid-out by
the leaky infrastructure is appropriate because the train is never
too far away from the railways) and because the train travels a
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long distance (and therefore the signal propagation also needs
to support a longer distance than what is allowed by a typical
omnidirectional signal transmission in an open-air medium where
the signal propagates in all directions). To further support greater
communication scope in distance, the train communication also
implements repeaters along the railway-parallel communication
infrastructure. These repeaters amplify the signal from one side and
re-transmit it to the other side of the leaky medium. Therefore, train
communications widely adopt such leaky mediums with repeaters
and their performances and benefits for train communications are
extensively studied, e.g., [21, 23, 25, 32]. Section 5 models the leaky
medium for train communications; our model uses variables to
abstract away from the system- and implementation-specific details
and is therefore generally applicable.
3.2 Threat Model
We consider an adversary disabling the mission-critical train com-
munications by jamming the train-to-train and train-to-wayside
access point wireless communication links. Jamming is typically
a low-barrier threat to execute since it does not require a-priori
compromise of the communication medium due to the inherent
open-nature of the wireless medium.
We assume that the jammer is within the signal/transmission
range of the train communications. For instance, the jammer either
has a high-gain antenna or is in relative proximity to the train
communication (e.g., along the train tracks or on-board the train).
This threat is even more relevant for leaky-medium communication
since the jammer can make an impact as long as it can get close
enough to any point along the leaky medium (i.e., the waveguide
slots or the repeaters) [16], as opposed to the free-medium com-
munication channel (in which the jammer must be in the signal
reception range of the receiving entity).
We assume aworst-case scenariowith a limited-power, unlimited-
energy attacker; thus the jammer continuously transmits the jam-
ming signal (i.e., constant jamming). However, the framework pre-
sented in this work can can also admit alternate jamming strategies
(e.g., random/reactive jamming). Jamming results in SINR degrada-
tion and prevents the receiver from retrieving the legitimate signal.
Thus, any digital security measures after the received signal demod-
ulation/decoding (e.g., those based on cryptography or network
security) become irrelevant and ineffective. For this reason, exist-
ing CBTC protocols place stringent requirements on the legitimate
signal’s power at the receive antenna as it directly relates to the
bit/packet error rate of the train communication [18].
In the following section, we formally quantify this attack impact
by modeling train motion under normal mode of operation and
during a communication disruption event.
4 MODELING THE TRAIN MOTION
We begin by modeling the train motion. We distinguish between the
planning and the operational phases. During the planning phase,
the trains compute a guidance trajectory, i.e., velocity and the ac-
celeration/deceleration profile, which they intend to follow during
their journey (see Fig. 2). During the operational phase, the trains
follow the computed guidance trajectory. However, when an abnor-
mal event occurs (e.g., if the leading train is too close or if there is a
Figure 2: Train velocity profile.
loss of the train communication for a prolonged duration of time),
they take a short-term corrective action (specified in Section 4.2).
Subsequently, the trains recompute their guidance trajectory for
the remaining distance of their journey. The details are presented
in the following.
4.1 Planning Phase
As in prior work [33, 34, 36–38], we divide the train’s guidance
trajectory into four phases – acceleration, cruising, coasting and
braking as shown in Fig. 2. We denote the train’s acceleration
and deceleration (due to service brake) by α and βser respectively.
During the cruising phase, the train maintains a constant veloc-
ity. During coasting, the train applies no traction or braking force,
and thus, decelerates due to friction only, which we denote by af r .
The duration of acceleration, cruising, coasting and braking phases,
which we denote by T1,T2,T3 and T4 respectively, are computed
to minimize the total journey time. We omit the details here and
present them in the Appendix A. The train’s guidance accelera-
tion profile, which we denote by aplan(τ ), is then given by (9) (see
Appendix A), where t is the time index when the guidance trajec-
tory is computed (t = 0 at the beginning to train’s journey). We
denote Aplan(t) = {aplan(τ )}t+T1+T2+T3+T4τ=t . In extreme cases (see
Sec. 4.3), the train can stop by applying the emergency brake whose
deceleration is denoted by βemerg, where βemerg > βser.
4.2 Operational Phase
Next, we describe the train motion during its operational phase.
We let vl (t),vf (t), al (t),af (t), and sl (t), sf (t) denote the velocity,
acceleration and the position (with respect to the origin) of the
leading and following trains respectively at time t . For simplicity,
we assume that the trains make operational decisions (i.e., whether
to accelerate, cruise, coast or decelerate) at discrete time intervals
indexed by t = 0,∆t , 2∆t , 3∆t , . . . , where ∆t is the time interval
between the decisions. We assume that the train’s velocity and ac-
celeration remain constant between n∆t and (n+ 1)∆t . Under these
assumptions, the following/leading train’s velocity and position at
time t = (n + 1)∆t can be recursively computed as
vi ((n + 1)∆t) = vi (n∆t) + ai (n∆t)∆t , (1)
si ((n + 1)∆t) = si (n∆t) +vi (n∆t)∆t + 12ai (n∆t)(∆t)
2, (2)
where vi (0) = 0, si (0) = 0 and i = { f , l}. The aforementioned
train’s operation decision depends on the mode of signaling mode,
which we describe in the following.
Moving Block Signaling: Under CBTC, during normal operat-
ing conditions, the trains follow the moving-block signaling (MBS)
mode (refer to Fig. 3 (left)), in which the following train computes
a dynamic headway based on the state of motion of the leading
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Figure 3: Train motion under moving-block (left) and fixed-
block (right) signaling modes.
train and adjusts its velocity accordingly. We let v̂l (t), âl (t), ŝl (t)
denote the velocity, acceleration and position respectively of the
leading train that is communicated to the following train at time t
(the detailed description of the communication model is deferred
to Section 5). Based on this information, the following train com-
putes a dynamic headway, denoted by H (t), which is the minimum
separation between the two trains to avoid collision under the
worst-case stopping scenario (i.e., when the leading train stops by
applying the emergency brake). The details of the dynamic headway
computation are omitted here and presented in Appendix B.
Fall-Back Signaling: To accommodate for the loss of commu-
nication, operators have recently started including a fall-back sig-
naling mode, in which the trains automatically switch to a fail-safe
mode of operation, which ensures that the trains do not collide
[28], [5]. In this work, we assume that the fall-back mode corre-
sponds to the fixed-block signaling (FBS) system (Fig. 3 (right)).
Under FBS, the track is divided into pre-defined segments or blocks,
and the trains rely on track circuits to know the block occupied
by the leading train. An entire block is presumed to be occupied
if a train is present anywhere within the block. Moreover, a train
is not permitted to enter a front block unless it is separated from
the next occupied block by a threshold distance (usually fixed by
the operator). We index the blocks by i = 1, 2, . . . , and let Bl (t) and
Bf (t) denote the indices of the blocks occupied by the leading and
the following trains respectively at time t . We denote the distance
of the start point of block i from the origin by dsi (see Fig. 3 (right)).
For safety, the trains must be separated by a minimum number of
blocks, which we denote by Bth.
4.3 Train Motion During the Operational Phase
The train motion is described in Algorithm 1. Before describing
the algorithm, we introduce some notations used in the algorithm.
Denote the time of operation by t . In each time slot, we let pkt_rec
denote a binary variable that indicates the status of communication
during that time slot, i.e., it takes a value 1 if the communication is
successful, and 0 otherwise. The variable pkt_loss_counter counts
the number of consecutive communication failures. Further, we use
Fixed_Blk to denote a binary variable that indicates the mode of
operation of the following train during the current time slot, i.e.,
1 indicates that it is operating in FBS mode, and 0 indicates MBS
mode. TmaxFB denotes the maximum duration that a train remains in
FBS mode.
We start with the description of lines 4–12 of Algorithm 1. During
each time slot, if the communication between trains is successful,
then the following train updates ⟨̂sl (t), v̂l (t), âl (t)⟩ according to
the latest information. Else, if there is a communication error, then
ALGORITHM 1: Train Motion
1 Set t = 0;
2 Compute Aplan(t ) by solving (9) with vinit = 0 and sremain = stot .
3 while sf (t ) < stot do
4 if pkt_r ec = 1 then
5 Set pkt_loss_counter = 0.
6 ŝl (t ) = sl (t ), v̂l (t ) = vl (t ).
7 else
8 pkt_loss_counter = pkt_loss_counter + 1;
9 if F ixed_Blk = 0 & pkt_loss_counter = N then
10 F ixed_Blk = 1;
11 TFB = TmaxFB ;
12 end
13 end
14 if F ixed_Blk = 0 then
15 Compute H (t ) as in Algorithm 1.
16 if ŝl (t ) − sf (t ) > H (t ) then
17 Set af (t ) = Aplan(t ).
18 Compute v(t + ∆t ) and s(t + ∆t ) as in (1) and (2).
19 else
20 Set F ixed_Blk = 1;
21 Perform fixed block update according to Algorithm 2.
22 Set TFB = TmaxFB − 1;
23 end
24 else
25 Perform fixed block update as in Algorithm 2.
26 TFB ← TFB − 1;
27 if TFB = 0 then
28 Set F ixed_Blk = 0;
29 Update Aplan(t ) by solving (9) with vinit = vf (t ) and
sremain = stot − sf (t ).
30 end
31 end
32 Set t ← t + ∆t .
33 end
ALGORITHM 2: Fixed Block Update
1 if Bl (t ) − Bf (t ) ≤ Bth then
2 Apply emergency brakes.
3 Set af (t ) = βemerg .
4 else
5 Update Aplan(t ) by solving (9) with vinit = vf (t ) and
sremain = dsBl (t )−Bth − sf (t ).
6 Set af (t ) = aplan(t ).
7 Compute v(t + ∆t ) and s(t + ∆t ) as in (1) and (2).
8 end
9 Return v(t + ∆t ) and s(t + ∆t ).
⟨̂sl (t), v̂l (t), âl (t)⟩ are assumed to be the same as that of the last
received information. If the number is consecutive packet losses
greater N (where N is a pre-determined by the system operator),
then it immediately switches to FBS mode.
When in MBS mode, the following train computes a dynamic
headway according to Algorithm 3 and checks to see if the distance
between the trains is greater than the computed dynamic headway
(line 15). If true, it continues to move according to the pre-planned
guidance trajectory Aplan(t) (line 17). Otherwise, if the trains are
closer than the computed dynamic headway, then for safety, it
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immediately switches to the FBS mode (lines 20-24). We assume
that every time the train switches from MBS to FBS, it remains
in FBS mode for a duration of TmaxFB in order to ensure that the
separation between the trains is sufficiently large, before reverting
back to MBS mode. If the train is in FBS mode, then it adjusts its
guidance trajectory to stop within a distance of dsBl (t )−Bth − sf (t)
(Algorithm 2). We note that Bl (t) − Bth is the index of the block
that the following train is not allowed to enter under FBS mode and
dsBl (t )−Bth − sf (t) is the distance to the start of the corresponding
block. After TmaxFB time slots, the train switches back to MBS mode
if the packet-loss counter is less than N . Further, it recomputes
the guidance trajectory for the remaining distance of its journey.
The train can complete the remaining distance of its journey with
minimum time, and hence, our analysis can be viewed as a lower
bound on the potential attack impact that a jammer can cause.
In the next section, we present the details of wireless communica-
tion model used in train-to-train or train-to-trackside infrastructure
and the jamming.
5 WIRELESS COMMUNICATION CHANNEL
MODEL
While the greater focus is on leaky-medium-based communication
channel, we also discuss the signal propagation under the free-wave
channel (which corresponds to the traditional wireless medium of
open air with no physical communication structure) in order to
compare and contrast signal propagation and jamming in the two
channels. We present the detailed description next.
Free-Medium-Based Communication: For free-wave com-
munication, we adopt the log-distance pathloss model in which the
path loss, η measured in dB scale, at a distance d from the transmit-
ter is given by
η = η0 + 10γ log10(d) + X , (3)
where η0 is the reference pathloss, γ is the pathloss exponent and
X is a random variable that captures the fading effect.
Leaky-Medium-Based Communication: The leaky-medium
based communication is illustrated in Fig. 1. We denote the inter-
repeater distance by drptr and the amplifying gain of the repeater
by Crptr . In leaky-medium-based communication, total pathloss
consists of a longitudinal component ηl , a radial components ηr ,
as well as the pathloss due to the repeater ηrptr , given by [22],
η = ηl + ηrptr + ηr . (4)
The longitudinal component is linear in dB, and is given by ηl =
Ccplnд + αdl , where Ccplnд is the coupling loss and α is the rate
of loss over longitudinal distance dl . The radial component ηr =
η0,r + 10 log10(dr ) + Xr where η0,r is the path loss due to leakage
through the slot and Xr is the fading of the free wave after the
leakage. Finally, ηrptr is given by ηrptr = −CrptrNrptr , where
Nrptr is the number of repeaters that the signal passes through.
The negative sign indicates that the signal is amplified due to the
repeater (and hence the pathloss is negative).
Jamming Attack: We consider an adversary transmitting a
jamming signal with power P ′J . We let P
′
S denote the transmit power
of the legitimate signal. The received powers of the legitimate and
the jamming signal are denoted by P˜ ′S and P˜
′
J respectively. The
signal to interference noise ratio at the receiver is then given by
SINR =
P˜ ′S
P˜ ′J + P˜
′
N
≈ P˜
′
S
P˜ ′J
, (5)
where in the approximation, we ignore the noise power, since we
consider an interference-limited system. Jamming is successful if
the SINR is below a threshold value τ ′, i.e., SINR < τ ′. In dB scale,
using (5) , it follows that jamming is successful if P˜S − P˜ J < τ ,
where P˜S , P˜ J and τ denote the corresponding quantities in dB scale.
We note that the transmit and the received powers in dB scale are
related as P˜S = PS − ηS and P˜ J = P J − η J . Let dS,R denote the dis-
tance between the legitimate transmitter and the receiver and d J ,R
between the jammer and the receiver. In the following, we express
the pathloss for the legitimate and the jamming signals under the
free-medium and the leaky-medium-based communications.
We first consider the free-medium communication. From (3),
it follows that, the pathloss for the legitimate and jammer’s sig-
nals are given by ηS = η0 + 10γ log10(dS,R ) + X and η J = η0 +
10γ log10(dI,R ) + X respectively.
Next, we consider the leaky-medium-based communication. We
follow (4) and analyze each component individually. First, we con-
sider the longitudinal component ηl . Note that the legitimate signal
from the trackside infrastructure gets injected to the waveguide by
wired connection. Thus it suffers from coupling loss Ccplnд only.
In contrast, the jammer’s signal gets injected into the waveguide by
following a wireless path. Thus, it suffers an additional pathloss due
to the freewave path, given by η J ,wд = η0 + 10γ loд10(d J ,wд) + X
(similar to (3)), where d J ,wд is the distance of the jammer from
the waveguide signal injection point. The distance-based pathloss
of the longitudinal component for the two signals are given by
αdS,R and αd J ,R respectively. The radial component of the path
loss from the leaky medium to the train receiver is constant for
both the signals, which we denote by η¯r , as the train travels in
parallel to the leaky medium and is in constant distance away in
the radial direction from the leaky medium. Further, the pathloss
due to the repeater for the two signals is given byCrptrNS,rptr and
CrptrN J ,rptr respectively, NS,rptr and N J ,rptr denote the number
of repeaters that the corresponding signals traverse through. Based
on the discussion above, we have,
ηS = Ccplnд + αdS,R −CrptrNS,rptr + η¯r , (6)
η J = η J ,wд + αd J ,R −CrptrN J ,rptr + η¯r . (7)
6 ATTACK MITIGATION USING FHSS
REPEATER
To mitigate the jamming attack, we build on FHSS, which random-
izes the frequency channel access against the attacker for jamming
resistance. However, in contrast to the prior implementation of
FHSS, we apply FHSS not only on the transmitter-receiver pair (the
train and the track-side access point in our case) but also on the re-
peaters (so that the repeaters only amplify the signal going through
the securely-agreed channels); the novelty comes from extending
the FHSS on the wireless repeaters. FHSS implementation requires
radio signal processing capabilities (requiring the radio hardware
and the signal-level control, which is of finer granularity and closer
to the frontend than the bit-level processor/control).
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6.1 Defense/Spreading Gain
FHSS provides spreading gain to the legitimate train signal, which
we denote by n. By focusing the signal power on the narrower
channel, the effective SINR is increased by n (since given the same
power budget, the power spectral density must increase by n). Note
that the spreading gain n corresponds to the number of channels
available for FHSS randomization.
While the repeater gains have been Crptr for all signals (legiti-
mate and jamming) previously without FHSS, applying FHSS on
the repeaters changes the repeater gain to Crptrn for the attacker’s
jamming signals, assuming wideband jamming (jamming across
all possible frequency channels is the optimal strategy for the at-
tacker [15]). This is because the repeater filters out the rest of the
channels which are not being used by FHSS at the time. In con-
trast, the legitimate train signal retains the repeater gain of Crptr
because the legitimate train sends the transmission at the FHSS
band. After multiple repeaters of Nrptr , the legitimate signal gain
is (Crptr )Nrptr and the attacker’s jamming gain is 1n (Crptr )Nrptr .
6.2 Synchronization and Trust
Per transmission symbol, the train, the access point, and the re-
peaters agree on a channel, and they only process the signals from
that channel, effectively filtering the signals from the other chan-
nels. Across the transmission symbols, the channels can vary. Due
to the dynamic channel operations, the legitimate entities need to
agree on the channels and be synchronized in operations when the
channel gets switched. Our defense builds on the prior work in FHSS
(popularly used, e.g., in IEEE 802.11 legacy system) and the sys-
tems implementations development which enables the transmitter-
receiver FHSS communications. In this section, we review those
bases for our work.
As is typical in the traditional FHSS, the parties generate dynamic
frequency hopping pattern using a pseudo-random generator (PRG),
making the hopping pattern deterministic to the legitimate trans-
mitters who have the key/seed but random to the attackers lacking
the key. Our scheme therefore assumes the key distribution for the
seed driving the PRG, e.g., using prior work [14, 20].
Our scheme also requires frequency-channel synchronization in
time across the participating nodes of the train, the access point,
and the repeaters. While wireless systems use time-interleaved
beacon/preamble signal for time synchronization (for example, by
appending the preamble signal before the data signal), we propose
the use of synchronization signaling that is independent of the
channel selected for FHSS (e.g., out-of-band signaling) to thwart
reactive jamming (which senses the spectrum use in real time and
adapt the jamming strategy accordingly). The synchronization prob-
lem is generally easier than in the context of the multiple wireless
nodes in a distributed setting because of the more tightly controlled
train networking environment, e.g., the OCC (which is consistently
communicating with the train) controls the repeaters as part of its
infrastructure and the train systems can afford to train and calibrate
the networking and the corresponding operations regularly, e.g.,
when the trains are not in operations.
The train-to-infrastructure communications correspond tomany-
to-one communication in the uplink, as there can be multiple trains
in operations while there are smaller number of access points (all
of which are connected to one centralized OCC). Therefore, there
can be signal collisions from multiple trains, and one train’s trans-
mission can interfere with another. To support multiple coexisting
transmissions, wireless communications provide multiple chan-
nels in time, frequency, code (e.g., direct-sequence spread spec-
trum (DSSS) and code-division multiple access (CDMA)), and in
space (e.g., multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)-based beam-
forming and picocell/microcell). To provide greater efficiency in
such channel use as a network, wireless systems also make use
of medium access control (MAC) protocols which have the subset
of the network users agree on the channel use and broadcast the
channel-agreement information to other users to avoid collisions.
While both accidental collisions and jamming can result in destruc-
tive interference to the communications receiver, jamming poses a
worse-case interference source and a greater problem because of
the malicious nature of the jamming source (we assume that the
jammer’s goal is to disrupt the communications); therefore, while
such wireless MAC-layer measures may be effective for accidental
interference, we build on them for general interference resistance
and use FHSS to defend against jamming.
7 SIMULATIONS: JAMMING ATTACK IMPACT
7.1 Simulation Settings and Methodology
The simulations are carried out in MATLAB. All the constrained op-
timization problems in the simulations are solved using the fmincon
function of MATLAB.
We simulate the motion of multiple trains along a single metro
line consisting of 30 stations. Each train commences its journey
from Station 1 and ends at Station 30. The trains are continuously
dispatched with a fixed dispatch interval of 90 seconds starting
from 8:00:00 AM. Between stations, trains run according to the
motion profile described in Section 4, and stop for a duration of
30 seconds at each station. For the train passenger flow, we use the
dataset provided by the Shenzhen metro line [35]. We use the data
corresponding to the “Green line" (which has 30 stations), starting
from 8:00:00 AM until 10:00:00 AM. We serve the passengers in
this data-set by trains running according to our simulations. (The
dataset provides passenger smart card tap-in and tap-out times,
which enables us the determine their origin and destination stations,
as well as their arrival times at different stations.)
The train motion parameters are chosen as follows. The accelera-
tion/declaration values are set to α = 0.7 m/s2, βser = 0.4 m/s2, and
βemerg = 1 m/s2. The maximum train velocity is vmax = 16.67 m/s
(i.e., 60 km/hr). The inter-station distance between two adjacent
stations is taken to be 2.8 kms for all the stations. For fixed block,
the block length is set to 400 m. We note that these simulation pa-
rameters approximately reflect the settings of a real metro system.
The interval between train operational decisions (i.e., ∆t defined
in Section 4) is assumed to be 0.25 seconds. We assume that if
communication failure occurs for a duration 2 seconds, then the
train switches from MBS mode to FBS mode. Thus N = 2∆t =
8 (recall its definition from Section 4.3). Further TmaxFB is set to
30 seconds.
Next, we list the wireless communication parameters. The SINR
threshold for successful communication is set to τ = 10 dB. For the
free-medium communication, the reference pathloss η0 is taken to
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be 90 dB. For simplicity, we ignore the fast fading component Xr in
our simulations. For the leaky waveguide simulation parameters,
we adhere to the Electronic Industries Alliance Waveguide WR-430
standards [22]. Accordingly, the parameters are chosen asCcplnд =
0.3 dB, α = 17 dB/km, η¯r = 62 dB, Crptr = 42.5 dB, γ = 2. The
inter-repeater distance drptr is set to 2.5 kms. (This distance is
selected such that in the absence of the jammer, the signal-to-noise
ration SNR of legitimate communication signal is always greater
than the threshold τ .) The transmit powers of the legitimate signal
and jammer, PS and P J , are taken to be 23 dBm each. The attacker
is assumed to be located at a distance of 0.2 km from the origin
and continuously transmits the jamming signal throughout the
simulation interval.
The passengers are served as follows. Whenever a train reaches a
particular station, all the passengers who have arrived at the station
before that time (in the dataset) are allowed to board the train,
subject to a train capacity constraint, which is assumed to be 400
passengers. If train capacity is reached, the remaining passengers
wait for subsequent trains. The total passenger journey time is
the sum of the wait time, (i.e., the time when he/she arrives at the
station according to the tap-in time listed in the data-set and the
time he actually boards the train), and the train journey time till
his/her destination station. The simulation starts when the first
train commences its journey from Station 1, and is carried out for a
duration of 2 hours (i.e., 8:00–10:00 AM). Whenever a train reaches
the destination Station 30, it is removed from the simulation.
7.2 Simulation Results
Comparison of Jamming In Leaky-Medium and Free-Medium Com-
munication:Wefirst compare and contrast jamming in leaky-medium
communication against jamming in free-medium communication.
In Fig. 4, we plot the SINR for one of the trains (14th dispatched
train) as a function of its position with respect to the origin in the
two settings. The SINR threshold and attacker’s position are also
marked in the figure. It can be observed that for the free-medium
communication, jamming is effective only over a limited range, i.e.,
when the train is in proximity of the jammer. In contrast, for the
leaky-medium communication, jamming is effective throughout
the train communication space. This can be explained as follows.
Recall that the pathloss suffered by the legitimate signal depends
on the distance between the trains, where as the pathloss suffered
by the jammer’s signal depends on the distance between the jam-
mer and the receiver (i.e., following train). In case of free-medium
communication, the intensity of the jamming signal degrades as
the train moves away from the jammer.
In contrast, for the leaky medium, we observe that the SINR
exhibits a periodic pattern and the attacker is able to successfully
TK TK-1 T2 
RN R2 R1 
T1 
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Figure 5: Simulation setup.
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nication.
jam the train communication multiple times. This can be explained
as follows. In Fig. 5, consider two scenarios: Scenario 1 in which
train T1 is just behind the repeater R1 and Scenario 2 in which T1
has just passed R1. It can be noted that in Scenario 2, the jammer’s
signal receives an additional amplification ofCrptr units compared
to Scenario 1 (as its signal passes though the R1). Thus, the SINR in
Scenario 2 is significantly lower than Scenario 1, and hence more
favourable for the jammer. As the train T1 moves away from the
repeater, the jammer’s signal intensity starts decreasing due to
the path loss, due to which the SINR increases. This explains the
periodic pattern in the train’s SINR.
Jamming Impact on Train Motion & Passenger Flow: Next, we
investigate the jamming impact using the co-simulation approach.
Unless mentioned otherwise, we present simulation results con-
sidering the leaky-medium communication only as jamming is
more feasible and impactful in this medium than the open-air free
medium (refer Fig. 4). We plot the velocity of two trains (i.e., train 3
and train 10) as a function of their position in Fig. 6 between sta-
tions 20 and 25. The yellow curves indicate the train velocities
during normal operation (without the jammer), where as, the red
and blue curves indicates the train velocity with jamming. It can
be observed that in the presence of the jamming attack, the train
brakes frequently (observe the reduction in train velocity). This is
due to loss of signal, due to which they frequently switch to FBS
mode. Consequently, the train has to decelerate in order to conform
to the fixed block headway.
We tabulate the train journey time with and without jamming
in Table 1 in Appendix C. It can be noted that the increase in train
journey time for the leaky-medium communication is significantly
higher than the free-medium communication. Moreover, the overall
increase in train journey time for free-medium communication is
negligible due to the limited jamming. We also observe a cascading
effect in the jamming attack impact for leaky-medium communica-
tion, i.e., the attack impact is higher on the trains that are dispatched
later. For instance, the train dispatched at 08:06:00 AM suffers an in-
crease 13.6% increase, where as the train dispatched at 09:52:30 AM
suffers an increase of 34.15%. This is because the trains slow down
due to jamming, and its effect propagates over successive trains
and becomes more severe.
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Figure 8: Device setup for the experiments (left) and device
setup for the repeater node (right).Experimental setup 1 wisec paper
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Figure 9: Experimental setup for leaky-medium (left) and
free-medium (right) communication.
We also investigate the attack impact in terms of the passenger
travel time and station congestion. To the illustrate station con-
gestion, we plot the number of passengers waiting at Station 3
between 9 − 10 AM in Fig. 7. It can be observed that the passenger
congestion significantly increases with the attack, which can lead
to an increase in the customer wait time.
Overall, between 9− 10 AM, we observed that on an average, the
passengers suffer from 33% increase in their total journey time. We
also observed that the attack impact was more severe on passengers
whose original journey time (i.e., without attack) was long. For
instance, passengers whose journey timewithout attack was greater
than 40 mins suffered from an increase of about 15 mins or more
due to the attack. This is due because trains move slower due to
jamming, which resulted in an increase in the overall journey time
as well as the station congestion (which in turn can potentially
increase the passenger wait time).
8 FHSS REPEATER PROTOTYPE AND ITS
EFFICACY
We develop a prototype for FHSS repeater, our defense for jamming
mitigation as described in Section 6 to demonstrate the effectiveness
of our scheme. In this section, we first present the details of the
SDR-based prototype and the testbed environment using leaky
feeder/coaxial cable system and then show the experimental results
using the prototype testbed. In the second part, we integrate the
FHSS mitigation technique in our co-simulation to investigate its
effectiveness in limiting the jamming attack impact.
FHSS Repeater Prototype:We first present details of the FHSS
repeater prototype. Each node is prototyped using a Universal Soft-
ware Radio Peripheral (USRP) B2100 board [7] hosted and processed
by a computer, as shown in Fig. 8 (left). We implement the func-
tionality of each nodes using GNURadio [8]. The testbed comprises
of four nodes: the transmitter (Tx), the receiver (Rx), the repeater
(Rr), and the jammer (J).
i) Setup for leaky-medium communication: A schematic diagram
for this scenario is shown in Fig. 9 (left). The Tx node, that emulates
a train, consists of an omni-directional antenna transmitting into
the free-wave medium. The Rr node receives the Tx signal using an
omni-directional antenna and the Rr retransmits the signal into the
leaky coaxial cable using a direct connection (the repeater setup
is shown in Fig. 8 (right)). The Rx node is also directly connected
to the leaky coaxial cable and receives the signal sent from the Rr.
The jammer node consists of an omni-directional antenna, which
injects its signal into the free-wave medium. This signal in turn
gets injected into the leaky coaxial cable.
ii) Setup for free-medium communication: A schematic diagram
for this scenario is shown in Fig. 9 (right). In this setup, both the Tx
and Rx employ omni-directional antenna and communicate over the
free wave. There is no Rr node in this scenario. The antenna gains
of Tx, and Rx are set to same values as in the leaky-medium setup
for comparison. The jammer also consists of an omni-directional
antenna transmitting into the free wave.
Experiments and Results: In our experiments, all the wireless
transmissions take place between 400 to 400.5 MHz (we choose this
particular frequency band because it was free of interference in our
laboratory environment.). For simplicity, we transmit/receive ana-
log signals only (hence we do not perform modulation and coding
operations in our experiments). The legitimate nodes (Tx, Rx, and
Rr) employ FHSS for their communication and use a common PRG
to decide the channel hopping pattern. The PRG seed is securely
communicated to them by a central server (PC in our case, which
emulates the role of a central OCC in railways). The server also
broadcasts a control command to the legitimate devices to initi-
ate the channel hopping. The hopping duration is 1 second before
switching it to another channel.
For each measurements, we repeat our experiment with 10 dif-
ferent PRG seeds, and with each seed, we perform channel hopping
100 times for sampling. The Tx, Rx and Rr log their channel hopping
details to a file separately for post-processing and analysis. We also
verify correct and reliable communications in the absence of jam-
mer. When the jammer is present, it performs wideband jamming
by uniformly distributing its power on all the channels, as it is the
jammer-optimal strategy in SINR and channel capacity [15] given a
finite power budget. All nodes including both the legitimate and the
jammer have the same power budget, and we manually calibrate the
antenna gains and the node locations in order to match the SINR
close to 0 dB when using 1 channel in the free-wave environment,
so that the jammer successfully disrupts the communications if the
SINR threshold τ > 0.
To evaluate the spreading gain and the corresponding jamming
resistance, we vary the number of hopping channels available for
FHSS (n) while fixing the bandwidth for each channels to be 50 kHz,
i.e., the total bandwidth is 50 × n kHz. Fig. 10 varies n and presents
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three SINR measurements (the means and the confidence inter-
vals): the SINR at the receiver using the free-wave channel (“Rx
(Free-medium)”), the SINR at the receiver using the leaky-medium
channel and an intermediate repeater (“Rx (leaky-medium with
Rr)”), and the SINR measurement at the repeater (“Rr”); the first
corresponds to the setup described in Fig. 9 (right) while the latter
two is experimented in the setup in Fig. 9 (left). In all cases, the SINR
increases as n increases due to the FHSS spreading gain [27, 29];
the attacker spreads its power and therefore its effective interfer-
ence power at the receiver or the repeater decreases as n grows.
The SINR grows proportionally to n in free-wave channel, which
corroborates with prior literature in spreading spectrum, while
the spreading gain n provides even greater gain in leaky-medium
channel with a repeater.
Comparing the free-wave channel and the repeater-aided leaky-
medium channel, the leaky channel with the repeater outperforms
the free-wave medium for both the receiver and the repeater consis-
tently across n because the leaky medium offers guided propagation
whereas free-wave does not and can be subjected to multi-path
effects. In the leaky-medium communication environment, the re-
ceiver SINR is greater than the SINR at the intermediate repeater
because of the repeater gain Crptr , which was fixed to be 70 dB
for these measurements. However, while the repeater presence
increases the expected SINR because of Crptr , using a repeater
increases the variance/randomness, as indicated by the confidence
interval; the confidence interval is larger for the receiver with the
repeater and the leaky-medium channel than other SINR measure-
ments.
The choice of n offers a tradeoff between reliability/SINR per-
formance and the bandwidth use (which is a valuable resource in
wireless communications). Choosing n when implementing FHSS
repeater depends on the nodes’ relative power (and especially that
of the jammer’s) and the SINR threshold τ (which is dependent
on the physical-layer processing of modulation and coding, e.g.,
redundancy and error correcting code). For example, if τ = 5 dB,
then reliable communication requires n ≥ 4 for free-wave channel
while it is sufficient for n = 1 for leaky medium with one repeater;
the free-wave channel consumes four times as much bandwidth
for the transmission as the leaky-medium channel in this case. If
the SINR requirement increases and is τ = 10 dB (as in the case
in Section 7), e.g., the physical-layer processing at the receiver is
more aggressive for greater data goodput and has less redundancy
and error-correcting, then reliable communication requires n > 8
for free-wave channel and still n = 1 for leaky-medium channel, in
which case the bandwidth consumption for free-wave is more than
eight times of that of the leaky medium.
Efficacy of FHSS Mitigation:We incorporate FHSS mitigation
into our simulations. The simulation settings are identical to that of
Sec. 7.1 (including the transmission powers of the legitimate signal
and the jammer as well as the jammer’s position). We plot the per-
centage increase in train journey time (with respect to their values
without attack) as a function of the number of channels n available
for train communication in Fig. 11 for the trains whose start time is
between 08:00:00 AM and 10:00:00 AM. We only consider the leaky-
medium communication in our simulations as jamming is impactful
only in this medium (refer Sec. 7). It can be observed that the pro-
posed FHSS strategy significantly mitigates the jamming attacks,
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and hence, the trains can operate under moving block mode for
longer durations. Consequently the attack impact becomes almost
negligible for n = 10 channels.
We also evaluate the impact on passenger’s total journey time
(sum of thewait time and the travel time). It is observed that the total
passenger journey time also drops down with increase in number
of channels. The waiting time of passengers reduces as the trains
arrive at the stations more frequently and there are less number
of denied boardings. Moreover, the travel time of passengers also
reduces due to the FHSS mitigation. (We note that the total journey
time of the passengers is different from the train journey time as it
also includes the waiting time at the station.)
9 CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we investigated the end-to-end impact of signal jam-
ming attacks against CBTC systems in terms the increase in train
journey time and the passenger wait time/congestion using a co-
simulation approach involving model of the train motion under
different signaling modes (MBS and FBS mode) and the wireless
communication channel under free-medium and leaky-medium
communication. Our results show that jamming can have a partic-
ularly severe impact in the leaky-medium-communication based
CBTC system by leveraging on the signal amplifying aspect of the
repeaters. To mitigate the attack, we proposed a FHSS strategy
and evaluated the proposed solution with an SDR-based testbed.
Our results demonstrated that FHSS method significantly improve
the SINR at the receiver for both free-medium and leaky-medium
communication methods and effectively limit the attack impact.
Signal Jamming Attacks Against CBTC: Attack Impact & Countermeasure WiSec ’18, June 18–20, 2018, Stockholm, Sweden
REFERENCES
[1] 2015. Officials: Rogue Boston subway train was tampered with. (2015). http:
//wapo.st/2zo78PU.
[2] 2015. Rail companies to be fined for late-running services. (2015). http://bit.ly/
2iCikTh.
[3] 2016. Confirmation of a coordinated attack on the Ukrainian power grid. (2016).
http://bit.ly/1OmxfnG.
[4] 2016. ‘Rogue train’ to blame for signal interference, disruptions on circle line.
(2016). http://bit.ly/2yzXIlq.
[5] 2016. Singapore Downton line signalling. (2016). https://tinyurl.com/yacucyoe.
[6] 2016. UK rail network attacked by hackers four times in a year. (2016). http:
//ind.pn/29x1NGX.
[7] 2017. Ettus research USRP software defined radio products. (2017). https:
//www.ettus.com/.
[8] 2017. GNU radio free and open software radio ecosystem. (2017). https:
//www.gnuradio.org/.
[9] 2017. Signalling system firm Thales apologises for Joo Koon train collision;
assures commuters that its system is safe. (2017). http://bit.ly/2hYKiIH.
[10] 2017 (accessed). GSM-R. (2017 (accessed)). https://uic.org/gsm-r.
[11] 2017 (accessed). TETRA. (2017 (accessed)). http://www.etsi.org/
technologies-clusters/technologies/tetra.
[12] American Public Transportation Association (APTA). 2014. Cybersecurity con-
siderations for public transit. Recommended Practice ATPA-SS-ECS-RP-001-14
(2014).
[13] T. Basar. 1983. The Gaussian test channel with an intelligent jammer. IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory 29, 1 (Jan 1983), 152–157.
[14] S-Y. Chang, S. Cai, H. Seo, and Y-C. Hu. 2016. Key update at train stations:
Two-layer dynamic key update scheme for secure train communications. In Proc.
EAI international conference on security and privacy in communication networks
(SecureComm).
[15] S-Y. Chang, Y-C. Hu, and N. Laurenti. 2012. SimpleMAC: A Jamming-resilient
MAC-layer protocol for wireless channel coordination. In Proc. International
Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking (Mobicom). 77–88.
[16] S-Y. Chang, B. A. N. Tran, Y-C. Hu, and D. L. Jones. 2015. Jamming with power
boost: Leaky waveguide vulnerability in train systems. In Proc. IEEE International
Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems (ICPADS). 37–43.
[17] V. Deniau. 2014. Overview of the European project security of railways in Europe
against electromagnetic attacks (SECRET). IEEE Electrmagn. Compat. 3, 4 (2014),
80–85.
[18] J. Farooq and J. Soler. 2017. Radio Communication for Communications-Based
Train Control (CBTC): A Tutorial and Survey. IEEE Communications Surveys
Tutorials 19, 3 (2017), 1377–1402.
[19] K. Firouzbakht, G. Noubir, and M. Salehi. 2012. On the capacity of rate-adaptive
packetized wireless communication links under jamming. In Proc. ACM Confer-
ence on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (WISEC). 3–14.
[20] M. Hartong, R. Goel, and D. Wijesekera. 2006. Key management requirements
for positive train control communications security. In Proc. IEEE/ASME Joint Rail
Conference. 253–262.
[21] Degauque P. Duhot D. Heddbaut, M. and J. Mainardi. 1990. I.A.G.O.: Command
Control Link Using Coded Waveguide. Journal of Transportation Engineering 116,
4 (July 1990), 427–435.
[22] M. Heddebaut. 2009. Leaky waveguide for train-to-wayside communication-
based train control. IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol. 58, 3 (March 2009), 1068–1076.
[23] M. Heddebaut. 2009. Leaky Waveguide for Train-to-Wayside Communication-
Based Train Control. Vehicular Technology, IEEE Transactions on 58, 3 (March
2009), 1068–1076. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/TVT.2008.928635
[24] S. Karnouskos. 2011. Stuxnet worm impact on industrial cyber-physical system
security. In Conf. IEEE Industrial Electronics Society.
[25] T. Kawakami, T. Maruhama, T. Takeya, and S. Kohno. 1959. Waveguide com-
munication system for centralized railway traffic control. IRE Transactions on
Vehicular Communications 13, 1 (Sep 1959), 1–18.
[26] S. Lakshminarayana, Z. T. Teo, R. Tan, D. K. Y. Yau, and P. Arboleya. 2016. On false
data injection attacks against railway traction power systems. In Proc. IEEE/IFIP
International conference on dependable systems and networks (DSN). 383–394.
[27] R. Pickholtz, D. Schilling, and L. Milstein. 1982. Theory of spread-spectrum
communications–A tutorial. IEEE Trans. Commun. (May 1982), 855–884.
[28] Alan F. Rumsey and Sue Cox. 2012. So who really needs a “Fall-back" signaling
system with communications-based train control?. In APTA Rail Conference.
[29] M. Simon, J. Omura, R. Scholtz, and B. Levitt. 1994. Spread spectrum communica-
tions handbook. McGraw-Hill: New York.
[30] M. Strasser, S. Capkun, C. Popper, and M. Cagalj. 2008. Jamming-resistant key
establishment using uncoordinated frequency hopping. Proc. IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy (May 2008), 64–78.
[31] T. D. Vo-Huu, T. D. Vo-Huu, and G. Noubir. 2016. Interleaving jamming in Wi-Fi
networks. In Proc. ACM conference on security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile
Networks (WiSec). 31–42.
[32] Hongwei Wang, F.R. Yu, Li Zhu, Tao Tang, and Bin Ning. 2013. Modeling of
Communication-Based Train Control (CBTC) Radio Channel With Leaky Waveg-
uide. Antennas and Wireless Propagation Letters, IEEE 12 (2013), 1061–1064. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1109/LAWP.2013.2279847
[33] H.Wang, F. R. Yu, L. Zhu, T. Tang, and B. Ning. 2015. A cognitive control approach
to communication-based train control systems. IEEE Trans. Intell. Transp. Syst.
16, 4 (Aug 2015), 1676–1689.
[34] Y. Wang, B. De Schutter, T. van den Boom, and B. Ning. 2013. Optimal trajectory
planning for trains under a moving block signaling system. In European Control
Conference (ECC). 4556–4561.
[35] D. Zhang, J. Zhao, F. Zhang, and T. He. 2015. UrbanCPS: A Cyber-physical
system based on multi-source big infrastructure data for heterogeneous model
integration. In Proc. ACM/IEEE ICCPS. 238–247.
[36] N. Zhao, C. Roberts, S. Hillmansen, and G. Nicholson. 2015. A multiple train
trajectory optimization to minimize energy consumption and delay. IEEE Trans.
Intell. Transp. Syst. 16, 5 (Oct 2015), 2363–2372.
[37] Y. Zhao and P. Ioannou. 2015. Positive train control with dynamic headway based
on an active communication system. IEEE Trans. Intell. Transp. Syst. 16, 6 (Dec
2015), 3095–3103.
[38] L. Zhu, F. R. Yu, B. Ning, and T. Tang. 2014. Communication-based train control
(CBTC) systems with cooperative relaying: Design and performance analysis.
IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol. 63, 5 (Jun 2014), 2162–2172.
APPENDIX A: TRAIN MOTION PROFILE
In this appendix, we present an optimization formulation to com-
pute the duration of acceleration, cruising, coasting and braking
phases (i.e.,T1,T2,T3 andT4 respectively) during the planning phase
of a train’s motion with an objective of minimizing the train’s total
journey time1. It can be cast as follows:
min T1 +T2 +T3 +T4 (8a)
s .t . v1 = vinit + αT1, (8b)
v2 = v1 + af rT3, (8c)
v2 + βserT4 = 0 (8d)
s1 = vinitT1 +
1
2αT
2
1 , (8e)
s2 = v1T2, (8f)
s3 = v1T3 +
1
2af rT
2
3 , (8g)
s4 = v2T4 +
1
2 βserT
2
4 , (8h)
s1 + s2 + s3 + s4 = sremain, (8i)
0 ≤ v2 ≤ v1 ≤ vmax, (8j)
T1,T2,T3,T4 ≥ 0, (8k)
Inputs: vinit, sremain,α , βser,af r ,
Outputs: T1,T2,T3,T4,v1,v2.
In (8), vinit,v1 and v2 are the initial, cruising and coasting veloci-
ties respectively, s1, s2, s3 and s4 are distances travelled during the
corresponding phases. Constraints (8b)-(8h) are the velocities and
distances travelled during the these phases computed according
to Newton’s laws of motion. The total distance travelled must be
equal to the remaining distance of the journey, sremain (constraint
(8i)). Constraint (8d) implies that the train must come to rest when
it reaches the following station. When the train starts its journey,
we have that, vinit = 0, and sremain = stot, where stot is the total
distance between two consecutive stations. Note that our model
1We choose this objective since the train journey time (and the corresponding passen-
ger congestion) is the primary metric of interest in this work.
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ignores some finer details such as the constraints due to track con-
ditions (e.g., its gradient and curvature) and train’s jerk, which can
be easily incorporated.
The train’s guidance acceleration profile, which we denote by
aplan(τ ), is then given by
aplan(τ ) =

α, t ≤ τ ≤ t +T1,
0, t +T1 < τ ≤ t +T1 +T2,
af r , t +T1 +T2 < τ ≤ t +T1 +T2 +T3,
βser, t +T1 +T2 +T3 < τ ≤ t +T1 +T2 +T3 +T4,
(9)
where t is the time index when the guidance trajectory is computed
(t = 0 at the beginning to train’s journey).
APPENDIX B: DYNAMIC HEADWAY
COMPUTATION UNDER MOVING-BLOCK
SIGNALLING
In MBS, dynamic headway is the minimum separation between the
two trains to avoid collision under the worst-case stopping scenario
(i.e., when the leading train applies emergency brake). Note that the
leading train communicates its velocity and position (i.e., v̂l (t), ŝl (t))
to the following train via the trackside equipments. Based on this
information, the following train computes the dynamic headway
as follows:
ALGORITHM 3:Moving Block Headway Computation
1 Inputs: t, v̂l (t ), ŝl (t ), vf (t ), sf (t ).
2 Output: H (t ).
3 Set H (t ) = 0, v˜f = vf (t ), v˜l = v̂l (t ), s˜f = sf (t ). while v˜f ≥ 0 do
4 s˜l ← v˜l∆t + 12 βemerg(∆t )2, s˜f ← v˜f ∆t + 12 βser(∆t )2
5 v˜l ← max(v˜l + βemerg∆t, 0), v˜f ← v˜f + βser∆t
6 H (t ) ← max(s˜f − s˜l , H (t )).
7 end
In the above algorithm, steps 4–6 ensure that the following train
has sufficient distance to stop using its service brake when the
leading train applies the emergency brake (the emergency brake
deceleration is denoted by βemerg, where βemerg > βser).
APPENDIX C: SIMULATION RESULTS
In this appendix, we present the total train journey time of a few
of the trains from our simulations.
Start time Leaky-medium Free-mediumJourney
time (mins)
%Inc Journey
time (mins)
%Inc
08:06:00 131.22 15.71 113.4 0.02
08:45:00 138.63 22.27 113.4 0.02
09:52:30 152.1 34.15 113.4 0.02
Table 1: Train journey time under jamming with free and
leaky medium. Journey time without attack is 113 mins.
